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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
~' • \ • ~- ,. .... '~J 
·_.;, ·~ . ,· t'··· ' >{ 
GEORGE A. LOWE C011P ANY, a 
corporation, THE SALT L i\. K E 
HARDWARE COMPANY, a cor-
poration, and STREVELL PATER-




PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, D 0 N A L D HACKING, 
Chairman, W. R. MciNTYRE and 
OSCAR W. CARLSON, Commis-
stoners, 
Respondents. 
, Case No. 7283 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACT 
The petitioners herein during the month of October, 
1948 entered into an agreement the full text of which is set 
forth in the petitioners' brief, whereby the petitioners jointly 
rented a motor truck and hired a driver to transport mer-
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chandise belonging to the petitioners to their customers 
throughout the State of Utah. The petitioners seek this writ 
on the grounds that if not restrained the Public Service Com-
mission of Utah will interfere with the operation of this 
business arrangement. Respondents have taken no exception 
to the form of the action or the sufficiency of the pleadings 
as it is the desire of the respondents to secure a judicial 
determination of the question here involved in the n1ost ex-
peditious manner. 
It is the contention of the respondents that the operation 
as carried on by the petitioners is contrary to the laws of 
the State of Utah regulating contract motor carriers of property 
for the reasons which will be hereafter more fully discussed. 
The respondents will attempt to meet the arguments raised 
by the petitioners in their brief and then will set forth affirm-
ative arguments in favor of their position herein. 
ARGUMENT 
THE AGREEMENT HERE IN QlJESTION IS IN FACT 
AND EFFECT A PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT. 
It is the position of the respondents herein that the agree-
ment entered into by the petitioners is an agreement by the 
petitioners to carry on a business of transporting goods and 
merchandise over the. high\vays of the State of Utah and that 
by virtue of _said agreement a new partnership entity comes 
into being, which partnership entity is a contract motor 
carrier of property as defined in Sec. 76-5-13 U.C.A., 1943. 
As is stated by petitioners, Sec. 69-1-3, U.C.A., 1943 
provides: 
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,ttA partnership ·is an association of. two or more per-
son~ to carry on as co-owners a business fo~ profit, .. ~~ 
Sec. 69-1-1 lT.C.A., 1943 defines the \VO(d per~o~1 as! us~d 
in the chapter on partnership as follows: . 
'~ 'Person' includes individuals, partnerships, corpora~ 
tions and other associations." 
The fact that the three petitioners are corporations in 
themselves would have no effect upon whether. or not their 
association in a business foreign and apart from the business 
which they operate in their corporate capacity constitutes a 
partnershtp. 
Petitioners make several categorical statements regarding 
the nature of their operation none of which appear to the 
respondents to be supported by the facts of the, case. They 
state first that the activity carried on pursuant to the agree-
ment set forth in the petitioners brief is not a business. With 
this statement he respondents cannot agree. The term "business" 
is rather a loosely used term to describe any commercial activity. 
Webster defines the term as: 
"That which busies, or engages time, attention or 
labor as a principal serious concern or interest." 
The following definitions are found in the cases indicated: 
" 'Business' in its broad sense is tl;le effort of men by 
varied methods of' dealing with each 'other to 'improve 
their individual ·economic conditions and satisfy their 
desires." People ex rei Attorney General v. Jersin, 
(Colo.) 74 Pac. 2nd 668 . 
. " 'Business' is a very comprehensive term and e~braces 
everything about which a person· can be employed." 
In re Booth, 18 Fed. Supp. 79. 
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Certainly the activity carried on by the petitioners under 
their contract appears. to be a business within the contemplation 
of . the. partnership act 
Th~ petitioners state furth~r that they are not the co-
owners of anything. With this statement also the respondents 
take issue. It is not necessary that the partners own in common 
any tangible property, or for that matter any intangible prop-
erty other than the partnership business itself. For instance, 
it is entirely conceivable that a legal partnership might exist 
without the partners owning a book, a piece of office furniture 
or everi the lease on an office provided that they were co-
owners of the legal business. This approach was taken by 
the court in the case of Bentley v. Brossard, 33 Utah 396, 
94 P 736, where the court stated: 
"Furthetmore each party here had, not only an in-
terest in carrying on the business or adventure, but 
also a common ownership in the business itself." 
However if the petitioners desire something other than 
mere co-ownersh1 p of the business as a basis for establishment 
of a partnership it is called to the attention of the court that 
in the case now being argued, the petitioners are co-owners 
of leases on motor ;vehi>cles. No reason appears why the 
owner of a lease-hold interest ~ould not be within the term 
ownership just as .much as would be the owner of the residual 
interest. 
Further the petitioners state that this is not a business 
carried. on for profit. Here also the respondents are forced 
to take issue. It must be assumed that as a result of this 
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working arrangement the petitioners are able to secure trans-
portation for their merchandise at ·a lower . price than they 
would have to pay other contract carriers. At .least it should · 
be assumed t~at that was the hope and desire with. which 
they entered into the partnership arrangement. If such· is the 
case and the petitioners were each to pay to the partnership 
entity the regulady established price of other contract carriers, 
a profit would result which would be available for distribution. 
Rather than pay this higher amount and then distribute the 
amount over and above costs back to the partners in the form 
of profit, the petitioners choose to make the payment to 
the partnership entity in an amount just sufficient to cover 
actual operating expenses. By doing this they receive a 
financial advantage just as real and in the same amount as 
if there were a distribution of the residue of 1ncome over 
and above expenses. Once again referring to Webster, 
"profit" is defined as: 
ccAquisition of good, useful consequence, benefit, 
avail, gain." 
The following definition of uprofit" is found in }Jundy 
v. Van Hoose (Ga.) 30 SE 783: 
ccProfit is the acquisition beyond expenditure; · exce~s 
· 'of value received for producing, keeping or selling over 
cost, hence pecuniary gain in any transaction. or· occu-
pation.'' 
The fact that the petitioners may .not have intenc;led to 
enter into a partnership arrangement . is not controlling if in. 
fact the association formed is such as is in contemplation 
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of the law, :is a ·partnership. · As was stated· ·by this court 
in -the case .of: ·Bentley v.· Brossard; 33' U 396, 94 P 736: at 
pag~742: . . .. - '· 
!: ,·'··I' 
· c 'Wlieri ··the triil ·court perrriltteel: the jury to deter-
mine· from all the evidence and· circumstances ·"Whether 
the defendants had intended to assume the relation 
of partnership towards each other, it also committed 
error. True it is sometimes said that to constitute a 
partnership the parties must have intended to create 
such relation. . c But,' as was said by the court in the 
case of Fleming v. Lay, 109 Fed. 952, 48 C.C.A. 748, 
'by this it is meant to say they must have intended 
to make such stipulations as in law constitute a partner-
. ship, and not that they intended the conclusion with-
out regard to the conditions upon which it results 
as matter of law.' And, as said by Mr. Lindley in 
_l,lis work on partnership, 'if they have in fact stipulated 
for all the rights of partners, an agreement that they 
shall not be partners is a useless protest against the 
consequences of their real agreement.' 1 Lindl. Partn. 
(5th Ed.) 11) " 
See also in this connection Bridgman v. Winsness, 34 U 
383, 98 Pac. 186. 
Let us ask ourselves, if this is not a partnership, what 
sort of an association is it? It is certainly more than a joint 
venture. A joint venture :has,many of the· aspects· of a partner-
ship. except that -it, is confined to one· or a limited number 
of transactions.. . Here the association is- conducting for a 
petiod of- time . a ·course of business. They are not limiting 
~heir· business to one certain- haul or to any limited number 
of hauls, but rather it is the intention to do as ,much hauling 
during the life of the contract as the persons ·with whom the 
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ask ourselves who \Yould be responsible should .damage ·result 
from the negligence of the driver of the truck during_ its 
oper,ation. . Certainly there is sorneone. or some ,association 
for whom the driver is agent .. It does not appear logical to 
maintain that he is agent merely for the company whose goods 
happen to be on the truck at the time such negligence occurs. 
While it is true that the expense of the operation of the truck 
including the salary of the driver is distributed between the 
three petitioners every tvlo weeks according to the time spent 
on the hauling for each individual member of the association, 
it does not appear that the driver would become the employee 
of the Salt Lake Hardware Co. when he was driving for 
Salt Lake Hardvvare Co., of Strevell Paterson Hardware 
Company when driving for Strevell Paterson and George A. 
Lowe Company when driving for George A. Lowe Company. 
The three companies do not make their payments in salary 
directly to the driver as is shown by the petition. They are 
billed every two weeks for their share of the expenses and 
although there is a breakdown given in the billing, a total 
figure is reached and checks are to be made · payable to H. 
H. Ellsworth, supervisor of their operations. Evidently Ells-
worth in turn pays the driver his salary. It is evident, ·there-
fore, that there is some entity existing between. the· petitioners 
herein and the pe~sons who maintain and operate the . trucking 
service. What .. can this entity be if not a partnership? The 
answer appears obvious that it is and must be a partnership 
whether the parties . intend it to be or not, and. whether or 
not there is a common partnership name. 
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· Although there ·appears to· be· no tase in point directly 
deciding the matter, the statutes of the State of Utah appear 
to·' regard' a· partnership ·as an· :entity separate and apart from 
the individual members thereof~· Sec. 104~3-26; Utah Code 
Annotated 1943, : prdvides that a ··pa'rtnership may be sued 
under a common name and that service of summons may be 
had upon one of the partners for the entire partnership. Such 
procedure is obviously inconsistent with the conception that 
no partrtership entity exists. 
THE PETITIONERS COME WITHIN THE DEFINITION 
OF THE STATUTES OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CONCERNING CONTRACT MOTOR CARRIERS. 
Sec. 76-5-13 U.C.A., 1943 defines a contract motor carrier 
of . prop~rty ~s .. follows: 
.tt ' Contract Motor Carrier of Property' means any 
person engaged in the transportation by motor vehicle 
of property· for hire and not included in the term 
common motor carrier of property as hereinbefore 
defined.'' · 
If the court agrees with the argument set forth in the 
proc~edi11g 'sec~ibn · by respondents that the association of 
tg~. petitjo~.ers: hc:r.eip. . cqnstitutes . a separate entity, the only 
question; to be -·determined in deciding· whether or not the 
op~ratioris' of the· petitioners partnership association comes 
within the d~fi11ition set forth 'above is whether . or not the 
op~~ation is c~rried ·-on for hire. · Certainly there can be little 
question that compensation is paid to the partnership entity 
oy· the individual members thereof for the services rendered. 
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Attached to the petitiJn are copies of the statements submitted 
to each of the individual members each two weeks by the super-
visor of transportation. Certainly this is compensation, and 
if in fact it is paid by the petitioners not to themselves. but 
to a separate entity it cannot be questioned that the operation 
is one for hire. 
In the Florida case of Merchants Mutual Association Inc. 
v. Mathews et al, 149 Southern 27, a nun1ber of companies 
had formed a corporation for the purpose of carrying on a 
transportation business to serve the stockholders under the 
same sort of arrangement which is now before the court. 
In deciding the question of whether or not the service can1e 
within the defin1tion of carrying for hire, the Florida court 
stated: 
((The appellant is a corporation organized for the 
express purpose of conducting the business of hauling 
by use oi its motor trucks on the public highways of 
Florida for con1pensation the good,s wares and mer-
chandise of its stockholders only. Under its charter 
it must haul for its stockholders at cost and without 
profit. The pleadings admit that the corporation does 
so contract with and so serve its stockholders. The 
terms of the contract are mere incidents to the trans-
action of the business. By limiting its patronage to 
its stockholders the corporation successfully eliminated 
itself from the classification of common carrier, but 
by the very terms of its charter and by ,its admitted con-
tracts with its stockholders it brings itself within the 
pervue of the statutes regulating private contract 
. '' earners. 
In a subsequent case, State v. Karel, 180 So. 3., .the 
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Florida Supreme Court decided -by· divided court , that, the 
same· ruling would not apply to an unincorporated association 
be£ause of the fact that under the laws of the state of Florida 
a>· partnership· was not· regarded:. as· having a;·legal entity; 
however, it did not retreat from its position irt the earlier case. 
In as ·much zs the Statutes of the State of Utah do appear 
to- regard a partnership as an ent_ity separate and apart from 
the members thereof, the reasoni~g of the Florida court in 
the Merchants Mutual Association Inc. case is compelling 
in this case. In the Montana case of the Christie Transfer 
and Storage Company v. Match, 28 Pac. ( 2d) 470, the 
Montana Supreme Court held that an unincorporated associa-
tion hauling for· its members was not within the statutes, but 
here· again the court reached its position on the ground that 
there ·was no such thing as a partnership entity and that the 
members of the association were merely hauling for them-
selves. However; if- the position is taken as our statutes seem 
to· require· that the partnership entity be regarded as a thing 
separate and apart from the individual members thereof, the 
logic of the Montana case has no application whatsoever. 
THE PROPOSED ACTION OF THE COMMISSION DOES 
NOT VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTIONS OF . THE 
.UNITED STATES OR OF THE STATE OF UTAH . 
. "t: ' ~~-~·r~~·: _J "\""·~ :-~·~t / ' 1 ' 1 t '.i .1 , 
The .q~es.tlon_ of whether or .-~o_t the ~t~empt of the Pub-
lic Service:. ¢omrhission to -~eg~l~te the·. ~perations of the 
-1 • • • ' . ' 
petitioners- meets with a . constitutional objection of course 
depends ·upen whether or not we are in fact concerned with 
a matter of hauling- for hire. At one time the courts leaned 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
to the view that public regulatory bodies could regulate the 
activities only of common carriers. However, it soon became 
evident that in order to protect comn1on carriers it was nec-
essary that some regulations be exercised over those engaged 
in business as contract carriers for hire. 
In the case of Hicklin v. Coney, 290 U. S. 169, the Supreme 
Court of the lTnited States upheld the power of statutes 
regulating the operations of private contract carriers. The 
term private contract carrier has been defined in a number 
of cases, see Ace High Dress Co. v. J. C. Trucking Co. (Conn.) 
191 Atlantic 536; Koppers Conn. Coke Co. v. James Mc-
Williams Blue Line 18 Fed. Supp 992; First National Stores 
v. H. P. Welch C o.(Mass.) 55 N. E. 2nd 200. Here again 
the question of whethe.r or not the petitioners' association 
falls within the accepted definitions of contract motor carriers 
depends upon whether or not a partnership entity is recognized 
as separate and apart from the individual members thereof. 
If it is so recognized, then clearly v1e have a contract motor 
carrier for hire, the regulation of which is prescribed by the 
statutes and permitted by the constitution. If there is no con-
tract carriage for hire, then the statutes do not prescribe the 
regulation and so we are involved with no constitutional 
question. 
THE LEASE OF THE VEHICLE TO PETITIONERS CON-
STITUTES THE OWNER OF SUCH \'EHICLE A 
CONRACT MOTOR CARRIER FOR HIRE. 
A matter which has not been considered by petitioners 
in their brief or in their petition but which is very material 
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in this~. case is the status of the . owner of the motor vehicles 
which are leased by the petitioners .. This so called lease 
arrangement is a device which has been attempted in this 
state by a' number' of operators irl' an attempt . to ·contravene 
the s·tatutes of the State rega.rding 'contract motor "carriers. 
It. is the position of the Commission than an individual that 
leases a motor vehicle for compensation to another individual 
~o be used by that individual for hauling property upon the 
highways of the State of Utah is a contract motor carrier for 
hire and comes under the regulations of the statute. To hold 
other wise would· be to permit subterfuge which would in-
validate the Contract motor carrier regulations. 
In the case of Cove v. The District of Columbia, 90 Fed. 
2nd 383, the court held that a person engaged in the business 
of renting funeral cars for persons desiring to use the same 
was a contract motor carrier for hire even though full control 
of ~he operation. of the vehicle was under the person hiring 
the same. 
In the case of State ex Rel Anderson v. Williston (Mis-
souri) 102 So. W 2nd 199, a similar ruling was made in regard 
to one who chartered buses. The fact that in the case now 
before. the .. · court the 'lessee paid the gas and · oil and other 
operating expenses of the truck in addition to the lease charge 
offers no distinction. The· owner of the motor vehicle is 
making available upon the payment of compensation a truck 
to be: used for transporting goods over and . across the high-
ways of the -State of. Utah~ and as such is a contract motor 
carrier for hire. In order to prevent a violation of the law 
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by this subterfuge the commissioner would take action against 
both the lessor and lessee of the vehicle. 
The court should look to the actual result obtained 
rather than to the form in determining whether or not the 
lessor of this equipment is actually operating as a contract motor 
carrier for hire. In the case of Denver & Rio Grande Western 
R. R. Co. v. Linc.k, 56 Fed. 2nd 957, the court stated: 
((A person cannot by the execution of a contract 
change the character of his operation from those of 
a common carrier to those of a private carrier.·' 
Likewise by the execution of a lease a person should not 
be permitted to change the character of his operation from that 
of a contract motor carrier to that of a lessee. 
In the case of Tilton v. Model Taxi Corp., 23 Fed. Supp. 
585, the court stated: 
"The fact that the owners rented the vehicle is in-
consequential, the important thing is how they conduct 
the business, not that they name it.'' 
CONCLUSION 
Although the number of individuals involved in the case 
now before the court is small, this method of operation if 
given judicial approval would result in a complete breakdown 
of the ·regulation of contract motor carriers by the Public 
Service Commission. There are many unincorporated asso-
ciations in the State of Utah having hundreds or even thousands 
of members. If these associations were permitted to make 
motor transport service available to their members without 
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regulation by the commission it is obvious that the regulation 
of contract motor carriers would be at an end. Common 
motor carriers of property would be subject to competition 
which would be ruinous and prevent them from rendering 
their necessary public service. The court should not permit 
this type of violation to get its head into the tent. The petition 
for a Writ of Probation should be denied. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CALVIN L. RAMPTON, 
Attorney for Respondents 
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